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Sexual Misconduct Allegations in The CAF

MilEME09

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Reading the past few pages it sounds like over the years the lines between the CAF and DND, administration wise have been blured and as a result also hamper our efforts to have accountability. After all if everyone has their hands in the cookie jar, who do you blame when the last cookie is gone? Sounds like our back end needs an overhaul to get us back in shape.
 

OldSolduer

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Reading the past few pages it sounds like over the years the lines between the CAF and DND, administration wise have been blured and as a result also hamper our efforts to have accountability. After all if everyone has their hands in the cookie jar, who do you blame when the last cookie is gone? Sounds like our back end needs an overhaul to get us back in shape.
I have long said we have uniformed members who try to act like bureaucrats with poor success.
 

Good2Golf

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The integrated NDHQ is actually a post Hellyer monstrosity that, as Infanteer notes, came about from a separate report on management efficiency.
But not unrelated…indeed it was a direct result in response to issues identified with CFHQ post-unification. Yes, Donald MacDonald was MND, not Paul Hellyer, and yes Trudeau was PM, not Pearson, but I think it fair to consider that Hellyer’s (and Pearson’s) intention was to increase the effectiveness of the armed services…hence why CFHQ was deemed outside of desired characteristics.
The two are actually linked. A lot of analysis in the late 90’s & early 2000’s identified that the integrated NDHQ was part of the problem in eroding the military identity of NDHQ staff officers and eventually contributing to disciplinary breakdowns in Somalia and Croatia. Today that blurring of military identity again is contributing to the problem. Look at how we are treating it like a civilian HR problem (remedial measures that are private) and not as an affront to the profession (which should be corrected in publicly observable proceedings).
Funny how many people slam Hillier’s efforts to try and created a CFHQ-like construct in 2005, but he got tarred and feathered quite effectively by the senior mandarins and press as simply trying to stack more GOFOs into NDHQ, not trying to gain some more command ownership within the DND framework.
 

McG

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The integrated NDHQ did not even come around as a “good idea” until after Hellyer was gone. A lot of analysis by Granatstein and Morton acknowledges a tendency for people to associate Hellyer’s efforts with integration but dismisses this association as inaccurate.

While the integrated NDHQ lives on, Hellyer’s unified HQ died when his operational commands reverted to being environmental commands in the image of the former services. Hillier was trying to de-integrate and re-unify CFHQ, and the self-perceived service chiefs gave at least as much push-back as the public service mandrins.
 

Good2Golf

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The integrated NDHQ did not even come around as a “good idea” until after Hellyer was gone. A lot of analysis by Granatstein and Morton acknowledges a tendency for people to associate Hellyer’s efforts with integration but dismisses this association as inaccurate.
I suppose you can believe that anything Granatstein and Morton say is gospel, but to believe that CFHQ > NDHQ was entirely unrelated to unification and its follow-on effects, and only to a different MND commencing action 36-months later, is a rather facile argument to make. Passage of three years and a bit to recognize perceived organizational deficiencies arising from unification, does not seem like a sound case for arguing two mutually exclusive circles on a Venn diagram.


While the integrated NDHQ lives on, Hellyer’s unified HQ died when his operational commands reverted to being environmental commands in the image of the former services. Hillier was trying to de-integrate and re-unify CFHQ, and the self-perceived service chiefs gave at least as much push-back as the public service mandrins.

So which is it? I thought you said Hellyer had nothing to do with NDHQ? So it would follow that Hellyer’s ‘unified’ command, as you call it, was indeed still CFHQ in 1968…through two (3 for a few days) more MNDs.
 

FJAG

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For me the whole problem was a vicious circle. We started of with essentially four headquarters: NDHQ, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Hellyer's unification/integration merged the last three in order to create efficiencies by reducing duplicated/triplicated functions. In large part that worked but simply created another layer of a headquarter in the form of CFHQ. Yes we eliminated three different police forces and three different logistics branches etc but by the time we were done we had created a number of purple agencies from what before had been relatively small staff branches in the three services. It was a time of empire building.

I could easily understand, especially in the eyes of someone as disinterested as Trudeau I, that having two separate headquarters - NDHQ and CFHQ - was one too many. I presume that they saw redundancies that were more apparent than real. Again it was a period of extreme austerity for the CF (but not other departments which rolled in cash with all the borrowing the Liberals did in those days to generate new social programs) and cutting costs was a really big deal. The late sixties, early seventies were their own version of a "decade of darkness".

The trouble that exists is that we truly needed four headquarters which were based on NDHQ and the three services. The services were distinct with different functions. While there were efficiencies to be garnered by unification/integration, the same could probably have been done through joint working groups to standardize trades, systems etc where appropriate. While we ended up shoehorning things together in a new unified/integrated structure, we learned over the next few decades that as far as staff for the Army, Navy and Air Force were concerned that, other than changing names, nothing substantial had really been reduced (other than fighting equipment and troops in the field which were steadily eroded.)

The trouble with it was that it was all so predictable. Unlike many of you who work within the heart of the beast, I have only a limited understanding of NDHQ's operations these days, however, the basic division as between the overarching management function of NDHQ and the overarching leadership and direction of the Forces is both logical and replicated throughout the western world. The lines of authority are clear(ish) on the left and right of arcs but, to me, are muddled in the middle.

20210312-orgchart-en.jpg


“No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other." Matthew 6.24 (I left out the money part)

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McG

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I suppose you can believe that anything Granatstein and Morton say is gospel, but to believe that CFHQ > NDHQ was entirely unrelated to unification and its follow-on effects, and only to a different MND commencing action 36-months later, is a rather facile argument to make.
If it helps, Bercuson’s work also supports the conclusion that integration was MacDonald’s work and not Hellyer’s. In fact, it this “facile argument” seems to be generally accepted by every researcher who’s looked at unification and integration. Check this article on CAF transformation initiatives: Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web

So which is it? I thought you said Hellyer had nothing to do with NDHQ? So it would follow that Hellyer’s ‘unified’ command, as you call it, was indeed still CFHQ in 1968…through two (3 for a few days) more MNDs
Which is what? I don’t understand where you are coming from here. Yes, Hillier created a unified CFHQ. No, he did not create NDHQ. MacDonald integrated CFHQ with the civilian bureaucracy to make an integrated NDHQ.

Really though, this genesis story does not matter to the current impacts of an integrated NDHQ on our faltering identity as a military profession. Too many officers doing jobs that should be civilians in DND, and too many civilians overseeing things that should be owned by the CAF. Suites and uniforms have become interchangeable in many work places. We need to bring back those boundaries.
 

dapaterson

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Hillier tried to create a CFHQ and was fought tirelessly by the Navy, Army and Air Force over fear of losing their own power.
 

MilEME09

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Hillier tried to create a CFHQ and was fought tirelessly by the Navy, Army and Air Force over fear of losing their own power.
Sounds like we need a CDS with the testinal fortitude to say STFU this is how it's going to be, get with it or have your VR on my desk.
 

Weinie

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“No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other." Matthew 6.24 (I left out the money part)

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I have served under two masters since 2008, and I equally despise or hate, or love and am devoted, to each, based on their response to issues.
 

McG

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Yes, Hillier created a unified CFHQ. No, he did not create NDHQ. MacDonald integrated CFHQ with the civilian bureaucracy to make an integrated NDHQ.
Crap, that should have been “Hellyer” not “Hillier” in there …
Hillier tried to roll back the command structure to that brief window between Hellyer and MacDonald.
 

Good2Golf

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Once undermined by the ECSes, who refused to downsize and provide staff to man the new operational HQs, he tried instead a failed picket and bypass.
MacLean was outright hostile and Caron was MacLean’s lackey, backing MacLean’s ‘FU’ to Hillier with an “Army agrees”. Pennie supported Hillier, noting the RCAF had already significantly down ranked its structure with a single op Div and no more multitude of BGen Group Comd’s.

f it helps, Bercuson’s work also supports the conclusion that integration was MacDonald’s work and not Hellyer’s. In fact, it this “facile argument” seems to be generally accepted by every researcher who’s looked at unification and integration. Check this article on CAF transformation initiatives: Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web
Ah yes, another of the “every officer should have a degree to professionalize the Officer Corps” crowd. That was clearly a great idea because there are no issues with the old boys/ring knocker network, right?
Which is what? I don’t understand where you are coming from here. Yes, Hillier created a unified CFHQ. No, he did not create NDHQ. MacDonald integrated CFHQ with the civilian bureaucracy to make an integrated NDHQ.

This V
While the integrated NDHQ lives on, Hellyer’s unified HQ died when his operational commands reverted to being environmental commands in the image of the former services. Hillier was trying to de-integrate and re-unify CFHQ, and the self-perceived service chiefs gave at least as much push-back as the public service mandrins.
You said Hellyer’s integrated HQ died when the “operational” commands died long before the renaming of RCN/CA/RCAF, and even at that, one could argue that the smattering of functional commands from Hellyer’s Unification was very scatter, to with 1 Cdn Air Div in Europe
Including the Cf-104 nuclear strike force , Air Transport Command and Trainkmg Command…I won’t delve into the Army but suffice to say, I think things were far from the rosy “Op Commands” bliss you describe. And still to the point that Hellyet retained CFHQ, so MacDonald’s NDHQ if anything, was subservience to PET to ‘admimisterize’ the military into de facto just one more department.

Much of this reinforces that it was a ‘team effort’ that led to where the CAF is now. Again I ask generally, which is it? The problem being senior officers trying to be something they’re not (uniformed bureaucrats) or perhaps some culpability on the part of government that deliberated blurred the lines of military command and civilian administration to creat a more
Civil-service like armed forces within government. Yes indeed, today’s situation literally took decades to devolve to what it is today, however, for civilian leaders to be so shocked at how could this happen (when they’re whistling past the graveyard with their own less than morally upright behaviour) is more than a wee bit disingenuous.

Perhaps this whole sordid situation needs, as some have suggested, an Independent agency that reports to PARLIAMENT, not JUST the Govt of the day.?
 

Happy Guy

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While over simplifying it, the blame must be laid at the CDS / VCDS who allowed this process of civilianization of the military. In the ideal world our political masters would ask for the desired effect(s) and the CAF provides it.

I do not know enough about how other countries deal with civilianization of their respective HQs since my experience has only been with the Cdns and the Americans. Perhaps a look at how the UK, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and other modern develop countries deal with it can help us. Yes I know that every nation's situation is unique, but there are lessons to be gleaned from it.


 

ballz

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I don't really understand why the continental staff system can't work at L0, most of the crap going on with the "departmental" stuff is just the Department doing stuff we already have uniformed people for / a system in place at every other level to manage. You can still have each J-staff supported by a host of bureaucrats as required. For example, obviously the CAF J1 is going to need an executive-level bureaucrat to support them in Civ HR.

MND
Internal Assurance [in other words, ADM(RS)]
External Military Grievance Committee
Ombudsman

CDS
J1 - CMP + ADM(HR)
J2 - Chief of Defence Intelligence + CFINTCOM
J3 - SJS et al
J4 - ADM(Mat) + ADM(IE) +some others I'm sure
J5 - Not sure who falls under here since we seem to lack both plans and strategy
J6 - Cyber + Info Management
J7 - MPGG, CDA / Purple-type things, etc.
J8 - Basically all of ADM(Fin)... Put the MGen in charge (CFO) and the civilian (perhaps replace what we currently have with a qualified one) as the CAF Comptroller.
J9 - ADM(PA)

Other advisors
JAG
Surgeon-General
MPG

I'm sure I missed a lot (i.e. Chief Military Judge) but you know, KISS principles and all, seems pretty stupid to have 4-staff at each L1, working for their Commander who works for the CDS, but yet ADM(Mat) just yipping from the DM's office.

MND tells the CDS what effects the government wants and the CDS makes it happen.


As for the Deputy Minister, all she seems to care about is the National Defence Workplace Charity Campaign. Those kinda influences are not helpful and take attention away from important issues.
 

OldSolduer

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Sounds like we need a CDS with the testinal fortitude to say STFU this is how it's going to be, get with it or have your VR on my desk.
Outsider's opinion here so take it with a grain of salt. The CAF needs to regain the trust of its members and Canadians.

How does it go about this is the problem.
 

SeaKingTacco

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Outsider's opinion here so take it with a grain of salt. The CAF needs to regain the trust of its members and Canadians.

How does it go about this is the problem.
Right. And what a number of us are saying is that trust comes from accountability. Accountability comes from knowing who you work for and who works for you.

Having a bugger‘s muddle of a CAF/DND chain of command did not cause some people to commit acts of sexual harassment/assault and sometimes escape consequences for years, but it sure did contribute to the failure to both investigate and to enforce discipline.

If we have cleans lines of responsibility, there is no ducking when it comes time enforce discipline, or to being found culpable if an officer fails to enforce discipline and generally take care of the welfare of subordinates- see QR&O Vol 1 chapter 4.02.
 

McG

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… I think things were far from the rosy “Op Commands” bliss you describe.
I never described anything as rosy or bliss. I noted that Hellyer made the joint operational commands and that he made a unified CFHQ (to which those commands reported). But I have also pointed out that. Hellyer was not responsible for the integrated NDHQ, which was done by MND MacDonald a few years later.

I feel you are very emotionally invested in Hellyer being responsible for integration, but the evidence does not support that. Further, blaming MacDonald for “civilianization” & integrating NDHQ does nothing in anyway to absolve Hellyer of the faults in his unification efforts. But they were distinctly different transformations imposed by different MNDs.

Much of this reinforces that it was a ‘team effort’ that led to where the CAF is now. Again I ask generally, which is it? The problem being senior officers trying to be something they’re not (uniformed bureaucrats) or perhaps some culpability on the part of government that deliberated blurred the lines of military command and civilian administration to creat a more Civil-service like armed forces within government.
If we are looking for blame, it starts with Donald MacDonald and his civilianizing integration of NDHQ. But the list goes longer than him. Who was the recruiting team that made the magazine add that depicted an officer with a briefcase and presented the officer corps as just like any industry executive class? They fed the problem.

We can also blame a great host of senior officers and GOFO who preferred pursuing the functions of bureaucrats - the ones who wanted to do capital project management, major procurements, or policy as opposed to managing the force, controlling operations, or stewarding the profession. There is a similar host of bureaucrats who wrongly decided their area of responsibility was in the CAF fields that our officers were ignoring. There is also the current MND for whom the position has been more an imagined continuation of his reserve identity than any actual effort to keep the CAF accountable.

And, as you note, the problem is decades in the making. Where originally people strayed from their lanes, everyone around today has been exposed to it through our whole careers to the point that many believe this is what right looks like.

We now have a culture where orders are for corporals not colonels, and too many are ready to ignore orders when they think they know better than the guy in charge. We are not going t fix that so long as suits and uniforms are interchangeable in all the various ADMs.

… and since we are in the process of calling out relevant points of failure, let’s not forget whatever team has been responsible for (though still has not yet) done the work to implement transition from summary trials to hearings.

Having a bugger‘s muddle of a CAF/DND chain of command did not cause some people to commit acts of sexual harassment/assault and sometimes escape consequences for years, but it sure did contribute to the failure to both investigate and to enforce discipline.
This. This is the right answer.
 
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