Topic: Integrating lessons from Afghanistan into individual trg & Trg for war vs trg for this war

[Spectrum]

Attention to detail is vital for the profession of arms.  Having said that, attention to detail does NOT imply sameness among many.  Imagine if you will a section of soldiers in Canada, on parade, in Fighting Order.  The sergeant comes by, and they all look the same.  Finding faults would be easy.  Now imagine the same section on parade, C9 gunners wearing C9 "stuff", same with riflemen.  This rifleman has an M 203, that one doesn't.  This rifleman has a special med kit, the others don't.  Big friggin deal.  The sergeant doing the inspection (imagine it's at WAATC, or any other battle school for that matter) checks each soldier's kit.  Not for sameness, but for functionality (and cleanliness, of course, and all that other jazz).  So-and-so has dust in his pistol grip.  Big deal, right?  I mean, it's not going to affect his weapon's function.  Having said that, given that it's a garrison parade in barracks, that soldier just demonstrated that he didn't pay attention to detail (see above).


And as MG 34 said, functionality of kit is also important.  Looking the same is "okay" if you're on parliament hill on a sunny Saturday, parading for the 125th anniversary of the founding of your respective regiments, but looking the same for sameness' sake in the fields of Panjwai is a potentially fatal error.

You can also really tell who can't move beyond what they learned on PLQ, when they can't comprehend why a person might want to say skip the canteen pouch and use two C9 pouches, or have their TV lowered.

Someone tell me we're having an institutional shift in terms of this stuff? 

[a Sig Op]

You can also really tell who can't move beyond what they learned on PLQ, when they can't comprehend why a person might want to say skip the canteen pouch and use two C9 pouches, or have their TV lowered.

Don't be knocking PLQ... before I did PLQ, I thought the keys to discipline were having motivated well-moraled troops with clear direction, goals, and firm, decisive, effective leadership.

Thank-god my course WO on PLQ sorted me out there. Apparently the one and only key to discipline is hats. As long as everyone wears the same hat, you'll have an effective fighting force.

[Rider Pride]

Attention to detail is vital for the profession of arms.  Having said that, attention to detail does NOT imply sameness among many. 

And hence why, in my personal opinion, it should be emphasised on course. Its not like everything thats is taught at school is exactly like it is at Bn.

[a Sig Op]

And hence why, in my personal opinion, it should be emphasised on course. Its not like everything thats is taught at school is exactly like it is at Bn.

Herein lies a huge personal pet peeve of mine. If it doesn't apply to reality, why teach it? The fact that most of the schools are 10 steps behind reality drives me nuts... example, my QL3 did little to train me as a sig-op, in particular, my QL5 was even worse in training me to be a det commander... if it's not practical, then cut out the nonsense and fix the curriculum.

Though that just ties us back to the irritation with the parade square mentality in the field... it really only does anything for poorly trained/poorly motivated troops. Create the artificial goal of everyone looking the same, and they'll work towards that, including maintenance of kit. Give them a real goal of accomplishing a mission, motivate them to do it, and some flexibility towards that end, and they'll square their kit on their own because it's required to meet their goal.

[CDN Aviator]

The fact that most of the schools are 10 steps behind reality drives me nuts...

Did you ever stop to wonder why ?

If combat vets and others with experience accepted postings to the various CF schools, then maybe we would make progress on that front. Since most guys balk at leaving their line units.......

[RHFC_piper]

Did you ever stop to wonder why ?

If combat vets and others with experience accepted postings to the various CF schools, then maybe we would make progress on that front. Since most guys balk at leaving their line units.......

Just to argue this one a little, and I really hope it's just a reserve unit thing;  When I came home, I was told in no uncertain terms that my knowledge was useless in the PRes system, as it didn't follow the IBTS guidelines...  There was no room in the trg plan for current knowledge and no one was interested except the JNCOs (who get in trouble for using the skills and techniques the vets passed on until they prove useful)

Then irony; The last 2 exercises of the year focussed on the same kind of stuff we did on TF3-06 and what is going on right now in Afghanistan. And the biggest issues with the last few ranges (live fire jungle lanes, pairs fire and movement and section attacks) were the lack of skills the vets of my tour offered to teach (tactical mag changes, etc.).   

And as for kit that has been more than proven in combat; no dice.



 

[BulletMagnet]

Did you ever stop to wonder why ?

If combat vets and others with experience accepted postings to the various CF schools, then maybe we would make progress on that front. Since most guys balk at leaving their line units.......

Not so, most of the Sgts and MCpls from TF3-6 were very quickly posted during the very next APS upon return almost exclusively to the schools (Meaford, Gagetown and Leadership School in Pet) Where from those I have had contact with since have said they are being told whatever your experience is it doesn't count here we teach as per CF standard not "how you did it in Afghanistan"....

Sadly it's an institutional malaise as it were IMO wherein because it is not standard it will not be taught. I am not sure how or why it seems to be this way maybe those that are much higher then I can explain it.

[PuckChaser]

Not so, most of the Sgts and MCpls from TF3-6 were very quickly posted during the very next APS upon return almost exclusively to the schools (Meaford, Gagetown and Leadership School in Pet) Where from those I have had contact with since have said they are being told whatever your experience is it doesn't count here we teach as per CF standard not "how you did it in Afghanistan"....

That's a shame really, why bother posting them to the schools if they can't explain how the real world works? They'd be better off at CMTC or just staying at their units.

[Hatchet Man]

.

Sadly it's an institutional malaise as it were IMO wherein because it is not standard it will not be taught. I am not sure how or why it seems to be this way maybe those that are much higher then I can explain it.

Operational jealousy/envy?

[Rider Pride]

they are being told whatever your experience is it doesn't count here we teach as per CF standard not "how you did it in Afghanistan"....

Perhaps a malaise, but if you recall a class I taught, I tried not to teach the way we do it in Afghanistan because I wanted to teach you skills for "war", not just skills for "THIS war"

edit to add- definitely not operation envy here.
But theres a piss-off issue when you are teaching or practicing a generic SOP, and someone says "well that's not the way we did it in A, B or C when I was there."

[Rider Pride]

Just to argue this one a little, and I really hope it's just a reserve unit thing;  When I came home, I was told in no uncertain terms that my knowledge was useless in the PRes system, as it didn't follow the IBTS guidelines... 

Perhaps the issue was in the presentation?

[MJP]

I agree with SMMT, there is a time and a place for great attention to detail.  A course especially a leadership course is designed if properly done to teach a soldier how to accomplish a task using the appropriate steps.  SMESC, battle procedure, Msn Analysis, Courses of Action etc etc.  It really doesn't matter what the task or scenario is as long as it is reasonable realistic and a soldier is given the time, tools and prior knowledge to follow all the steps.  It gives the soldier the depth of knowledge and the ability to tailor his orders to the time and situation at hand later on when he is faced with an armed enemy, tight timelines and real flanking forces that he has to consider.

We all know that things are done differently in Afghanistan, where FRAGOs rule the day.  Things were also done differently in Bosnia, Kosovo and every other place that the CF deployed to.  The reason we as the CF made it work and the reason we make it work in our current operations is at every level we were taught and read off the same sheet of music.  Commanders at every level know and understand battle procedure and if given the time can produce excellent orders.  I saw extremely well done and full blown Orders groups for routine convoys.  On the other hand I have heard on the radio with a quick FRAGO an entire BG stop in it's tracks, reverse direction and go back into Helmand Province to recapture some district centers that fell to ACM forces.

Likewise everyone knows you do not do a section attack across the opens plains in Afghanistan like soldiers do on a PLQ.  But really the section attack is just a tool/vehicle to get young/old Cpls to direct soldiers in a section setting against an armed enemy.  It is a matter of getting the basics down and mastered before jetting off to leading a section through complex terrain at night while under fire.  Some people are natural leaders and would have zero problems doing it with little practice.  Most people myself included have learnt the hard way through mistakes in training how to direct soldiers in combat.  That is why a course like PLQ stresses doing all the steps in the proper order at the right time.  Once you've mastered it you will know when to ditch the useless and go with the pertinent to your situation at that time.  But how will you ever know what that is UNLESS you have trained using all the proper steps.

Funny the soldiers that always talk about this is Ghey or this is not the way we did it in Afghanistan are the same ones that have trouble understanding the orders process to begin with.  It shows with horrible attacks/recces because they didn't understand what they were being asked to do nor could they properly convey that to their soldiers.  If they had a grasp on the basics, everything after that is gravy.

 

Did you ever stop to wonder why ?

If combat vets and others with experience accepted postings to the various CF schools, then maybe we would make progress on that front. Since most guys balk at leaving their line units.......

Dude I don't know about other units but 1 VP lost almost all their experience right after the TF1-06 with tons of officer and NCM postings to various schools across the board.  What was left is slowly being eroded away natural attrition and subsequent postings the following APS. 

 

Not so, most of the Sgts and MCpls from TF3-6 were very quickly posted during the very next APS upon return almost exclusively to the schools (Meaford, Gagetown and Leadership School in Pet) Where from those I have had contact with since have said they are being told whatever your experience is it doesn't count here we teach as per CF standard not "how you did it in Afghanistan"....

Sadly it's an institutional malaise as it were IMO wherein because it is not standard it will not be taught. I am not sure how or why it seems to be this way maybe those that are much higher then I can explain it.

The experience is there in the schools for the taking and quite frankly it depends and falls on the individual course officer, WO and the Sect Commanders.  There is time, latitude and the tools to get the required classes on the TP taught and pass on relevant "this is how it is really done" information.  A good Course O can and should tailor the field Exercises to a similar situations that are encountered in Afghanistan.  This gives the soldiers the ability to ensure that they understand the material taught and gives them an ability to see how it applies with real world situations.  It does not have to be exact as SMMT has pointed out, "Afghanistan is A WAR, not THE War.

[RHFC_piper]

Perhaps the issue was in the presentation?

Perhaps. 

All it came down to was the "teach by the book, not how it's done in Afghanistan."

Either way, I just don't argue it anymore... I just do my job.  I just hope the next group going over come back to better reception for training considerations, or the same thing that happened with members of my tour will happen with theirs; disillusionment followed by CTs or voluntary releases... it's hard to go from "how it's done" to "how it's taught" and not become bitter.

But, I digress.  The choice to not teach modern skills comes from much higher than the unit level; if it's not a part of the training plan in accordance with IBTS it doesn't get taught... not officially anyway.  The troops take it upon themselves to learn from those with experience, weather or not its supported by the CoC.

 

 

[Teeps74]

Not so, most of the Sgts and MCpls from TF3-6 were very quickly posted during the very next APS upon return almost exclusively to the schools (Meaford, Gagetown and Leadership School in Pet) Where from those I have had contact with since have said they are being told whatever your experience is it doesn't count here we teach as per CF standard not "how you did it in Afghanistan"....

Sadly it's an institutional malaise as it were IMO wherein because it is not standard it will not be taught. I am not sure how or why it seems to be this way maybe those that are much higher then I can explain it.

ECRs are necessary to force the system to change (hmmm... Kinda like UCRs).  When you are working on a course, you do have influence on that course. The trick is, is there anyone above you in the chain of command who is filtering information? If there is a change in core soldier skills (fire and movement for infantry) which is based on current ops, the I suggest that this information should and must be pushed up. Believe it or not, CTC and LFDTS are very reasonable organisations, they are just information driven.

For anyone to just summarily dismiss anther's experiences like I read in this thread, that's just plain wrong and idiotic.

EDIT TO ADD: Stuff like the Gun FIghter program are excellent skills... However, to get competant in those skills, we first need the baseline skills, as per current CTPs. If those baseline skills need to be modified, then let the paperwork through standards begin.

[Roy Harding]

I don't have a dog in this fight.  I'm retired.  AND, I was only briefly an Infantry Soldier (three years - way back in the '70s).  AND, I've only been peripherally involved in cbt ops (Sarajevo '94, Kandahar '02).  BUT, I spent a fair amount of time in the CF, and I'm familiar with the "you don't do it this way in Bn (or Ops), but you'll do it this way while at this school" mentality.

I'll admit that there was a time that this mentality pissed me off, BIG TIME.  But after time, and after exposure to many different environments and situations, it became clear to me that the "school mentality" was meant to instill a baseline competence in ALL people, regardless their particular past (or future) experience.

Having a baseline enabled me to understand what was needed by the organization as a whole, and by virtue of that understanding I was able to deviate from that baseline while still maintaining the essential processes which enabled my little sub-unit, unit, or formation to still "mesh" with the whole.

By having a "baseline understanding", person "A" is able to be a little to the left of that line, person "B" is able to a little to the right of that line, and person "C" is able to comprehend both ways of doing things.  Further - person "B" can relieve person "A" with minimal disruption to ops.

Someone earlier in this thread (I'm too lazy to go back and figure out who) said something to the effect that schools are there to teach about "war", not necessarily about "this war".  And whoever it was is right.

You need to take what you learn about "war" at school, and apply it to "this war" when you're in theatre.  "This war" changes (tactically) from month to month - "war" doesn't change, to any great extent, from generation to generation - that's why Sun Tzu still has lessons for all of us.

Those of you who have been in "this war" and have subsequently been posted to the various schools need to illustrate to your students how learning about "war", as you are instructing it IAW "the regs", applies to "this war".  The object lessons you have to impart are priceless - and will save lives.  The specific tactics that worked for you in "this war" do not necessarily negate the proved baseline tactics that are taught in schools.

By all means - adapt and overcome, but before you can do that you need a "baseline" understanding of what you are doing - that's what schools are there to teach.

I'll go back under my rock now.

[CDN Aviator]

Not so, most of the Sgts and MCpls from TF3-6 were very quickly posted during the very next APS upon return almost exclusively to the schools (Meaford, Gagetown and Leadership School in Pet) Where from those I have had contact with since have said they are being told whatever your experience is it doesn't count here we teach as per CF standard not "how you did it in Afghanistan"....

I should have been more specific. This needs to go beyond the schools. We have to send these people to jobs throughout the Trg system, from those who deliver the trg ( schools) to those who design the courses and those who develop the doctrine.

[rifleman]

That's a shame really, why bother posting them to the schools if they can't explain how the real world works? They'd be better off at CMTC or just staying at their units.

Having been at a few schools, they are better staying within units. They can use their experience to train those who will be deploying again. Bashing your head against a wall at schools really hurts

[Technoviking]

I have to dispel a few myths. 

Having not been in combat, I still consider myself a good instructor.  I understand the whole individual training system, and why it works (and why it doesn't work - at times).  You can have an instructor with combat experience who can relate empirical stories about a specific situation, or you can have a competent instructor who can think outside the box and adapt.  To think outside the box, you first have to understand what that box is, how it works, and understand that sometimes inside the box thinking is exactly what is needed.  Just as a one-size fits all approach to kit doesn't work, same with training.  I don't care if you're talking about training for a parade, for battle or for your wedding night. 

All this to say that there are basics.  Earlier, Mission analysis, battle procedure, etc were mentioned.  In my opinion, these are vital tools that MUST be used properly in order to understand what it is you have to do and how to convey that information to your subordinates in a manner that you know that they will understand.  This is the proverbial "box".  Thinking outside the box (eg: turning the BG around and fighting 180 in the opposite direction) is something that can be done quite quickly, but you MUST first understand WHAT you want to do.

It all boils down to paying proper attention to detail.  For riflemen, it may mean watching your arcs, looking for the odd clues that something is amiss.  For a staff officer, it may mean ensuring that you understand your higher commander's intent.  We cannot simply say that we pay attention to detail in garrison, and then throw away that box once the bullets fly.  Let's face it, we are not the first army to go to war, ever.  Our doctrine, manuals, methods of teaching, etc, are all products of men who fought other wars, and these are the tools that helped them.  Some of those tools may need upgrading, and others maybe may need to be cast off, but to throw the whole thing out the window once someone shoots at you?  Nonsense.  We may as well just give our recruits a few hours on learning how to use an automatic rifle and then send them on their way!

We have procedures, and these are baseline, and as always, they can be amended.  As an earlier poster mentioned, they got FRAG Os that were brilliant.  That is awesome.  FRAG O's are also part of our doctrine, which realises that you don't always have the luxury of time to sit down and spend 8 hours on a problem before issuing orders.  Heck, if you only have thirty minutes, you then don't have time for information briefs, wargames, etc.  Fine.  That's why we can do combat estimates.  Spending ten minutes developing a workable plan, relying on drills (another time saver!) will serve you well.  If you "situate the estimate" and come up with a plan without even understanding what your problem is, you are looking for trouble.

So, experience and qualification does not necessarily mean competence.  The mystique of "he's got combat experience" can only go so far.  Pay attention to detail, avoid silliness (eg: all wearing the same kit as though on parade) and be prepared to wisely use that box, or avoid it altogether, but for God's sakes, be competent!  And never be boring!


[/rant]

[ArmyRick]

We do have some of the combat vets here at Meaford and they do a good job of passing on their expiriences. However I find it interesting that when i asked them what we should be doing different and the list is not really that different. Mind you I am talking at the DP1 Infantry level. They do have to learn the basics, end discussion there. However we do try and spice the exercises a little later on in the courses. Yes alot of it depends on how proactive the course staff chooses to be. The LFDATS constraints are not that bad and there is some flexibility room.

Now training in the battalion is a different story.

[Haggis]

So, experience and qualification does not necessarily mean competence.  The mystique of "he's got combat experience" can only go so far.

Oh, how true!  Book smart is not field smart.

One can also get "combat experience" by blundering into an ambush, not clearing a defile properly or falling asleep on sentry and allowing your position to be attacked.

[Technoviking]

One can also get "combat experience" by blundering into an ambush, not clearing a defile properly or falling asleep on sentry and allowing your position to be attacked.

If it weren't true, it would be funny.  Sadly, though, it is true.

As I think more of my rant, experience matters, and I hope that I didn't come off the wrong way. It's just that though experience is necessary, it isn't sufficient.

[Haggis]

If it weren't true, it would be funny.  Sadly, though, it is true.

As I think more of my rant, experience matters, and I hope that I didn't come off the wrong way. It's just that though experience is necessary, it isn't sufficient.

In order to be relevant and valuable, experience must also be educational.  Making the same mistake repeatedly (as some are prone to do) is, in the purest form, "experience".  It's just not educational, as this implies that one learns to adapt from the activity.

[Greymatters]

In order to be relevant and valuable, experience must also be educational.  Making the same mistake repeatedly (as some are prone to do) is, in the purest form, "experience".  It's just not educational, as this implies that one learns to adapt from the activity.

Its also an uphill battle convincing the existing instruction staff, and the committee deciding on course content, that their methods and information may be outdated, or that your overseas lesson learned wasnt just a single event context.  That always goes over well...

[CDN Aviator]

Its also an uphill battle convincing the existing instruction staff, and the committee deciding on course content, that their methods and information may be outdated, or that your overseas lesson learned wasnt just a single event context.  That always goes over well...

Thats exactly why combat experience has to permeate throughout the entire system. One simply cannot send vets to the schools only. Other positions such as Staff colleges, Doctrine-writting/developing organizations, DLR, CTS.......etc,etc,etc..... have to be manned with people with the relevant experience. Those positions are not always considered as "desireable" but in the end if recent army experience is to benefit the entire organization, some people are going to have to put their money where their mouth is and take those jobs.

[Greymatters]

Thats exactly why combat experience has to permeate throughout the entire system. One simply cannot send vets to the schools only. Oter positions such as Staff colleges, Doctrine-writting/developing organizations, DLR, CTS.......etc,etc,etc..... have to be manned with people with the relevant experience. Those positions are not always considered as "desireable" but in the end if recent army experience is to benefit the entire organization, some people are going to have to put their money where their mouth is and take those jobs. 

Usually measured in years at the best, a decade or two at the worst... 

[WB]

I have to dispel a few myths...

...experience and qualification does not necessarily mean competence.

A big +1!

I'll take a switched on and open minded instructor who's never left Canada over a combat experienced dummy any day. I can think of a few guys who sucked before their first TIC and will continue to suck well into the future.  Experience alone doesn't mean anything. Any chimp who's survived an IED strike can claim to have experience. What matters is how you interpret that experience into a more effective way of doing things.

Just because you've been shot at does not necessarily mean you're switched on enough to know what to do in the future. Likewise, just because you're never been shot at does not mean you can't have an open mind and provide cutting edge training to your soldiers. The trick is in being able to interpret the experience of others.

Sound judgement and an open mind are much more important factors then actual combat experience.

[rifleman]

I'll take a switched on and open minded instructor who's never left Canada over a combat experienced dummy any day.

I'll take a switched on anyone, over a dummy... .

[ArmyRick]

IMO, we are making a freaking mountain out of a mole hill. The aim of entry level training for infantry soldiers is basic skills. A soldier has to know how to shoot, move, communicate. There is no point learning SOPs until they have mastered the basics. I have worked with some damn good vets (including one Sgt who is very well known for his actions when 1RCR was in afghanistan) and beleive me, there are alot of small things we do implement THAT DO NOT violate the "almighty" CTP.

Some of these guys I have been working with agreed that we have to master the basic skills first. They can train for afghan spefic in the battalions.

Keep in mind I am talking one school (Meaford) and one course (DP1 Infantry). I do not know who how the other Trg centers are doing business or the other courses (such as CAP).

For the record I am very open minded and I agree with what wonderbread said as well. Your either switched on or your not.

[BulletMagnet]

I don't think this issue lies so much with DP1, seeing the the basics core skills are always going to remain the same, I am talking more along the lines of the Mod 6 etc etc.

Example: Fall in for Battle, Seriously whoever does that anywhere anytime other the Mod6 and DP1 something like that is pretty much as obsolete as it comes and yet it's a requirement to be taught. I have never at anytime before a TIC/OP or Patrol did a "Fall in for Battle" No one did so why do we still teach it? because the CTP says so no matter how much real world dictates otherwise. Again coming down to "We do it this way because the book says so" and this little one that I have used as an example is a fly obvious one I mean I don't think anyone has really done that TTP since after Korea LMAO.

Rick: Hope Sean B and Scott F are doing well in Meaford

[pbi]

MJP: excellent post. You've summed it up. Schools don't normally train for "the war"-that's the purpose of pre-deployment training, which will always be more current and realistic than what we learn in schools. Schools train mostly for "a war", so as to cover as many potential situations as possible. The job of any course is really just to give graduates a basic tool box. The most important tool in the box is not really any particular technical skill (those change all the time anyway, especially as we change equipment or change types of operations or theatres) but instead it's the ability to analyze the situation, make a useful decision, and carry it out. If making that useful decision requires the soldier to scrap or modify existing TTPs or even doctrine: so be it. Canadians have proven, over and over again, that we have absolutely  no problem doing this. The fact that we went into combat in an extremely hostile environment in Afghanistan, with a peacetime Army, bore this out. IMHO what sustained our Army all those years before Kandahar, and what gave it the basic toolbox  to do so well when we got into the fight, was the training system we all like to kick around. You don't grow that basic tool box, nor the ability to teach it, overnight.

After years of cursing LFDTS, I actually belong to that organization, and I'm a trainer. One that thing that has impressed me since I got here is how much we have improved our Army Lessons Learned process, and how it's integrated with Army training. There is an ALLC team as part of the  Joint Task Force in Afgh, and they produce reports and updates on all sorts of things.  If that info is not getting out to trainees, it isn't because of Lessons Learned: it's because individual schools are choosing not to use it.

Cheers

DJB

[Infanteer]

Example: Fall in for Battle, Seriously whoever does that anywhere anytime other the Mod6 and DP1 something like that is pretty much as obsolete as it comes and yet it's a requirement to be taught. I have never at anytime before a TIC/OP or Patrol did a "Fall in for Battle" No one did so why do we still teach it? because the CTP says so no matter how much real world dictates otherwise. Again coming down to "We do it this way because the book says so" and this little one that I have used as an example is a fly obvious one I mean I don't think anyone has really done that TTP since after Korea LMAO.

I know this is a bit of a necropost, but it was interesting and I thought it worth commenting on.

I've often used this example as well.  This is the problem with our doctrine system.  We can lump criticism on the schools, but they only teach what is in the Lesson Plans which are derived from manuals.  Now, for the infantry organizations, where are we going to draw this from.  Our Infantry Battalion in Battle was written in the 80s and the Platoon and Section in Battle the late 90s.  The two are contradictory at times.  LAV Company was written early 2000, but is still labelled "Interim".  We don't even have a "Light Infantry" doctrine - it's an adhoc arrangment coming from a slideshow at a conference.

Section and Platoon in battle lists that first step of the Section Battle Drills that we all love to deride.  In its intent it is good - I would expect that section commanders are looking over before launching, regardless of what sort of mission we are on.  I suspect the yelling and screaming bit comes from years of "this is how it's always been done" without measurement to the actual conduct of ops.

However, my initial point stands - how are we supposed to teach anything when the basis for teaching is so out of date?  If there isn't already, there should be some sort of periodic routine reexamination of our manuals by not only the folks at LFDS (or LFDTS or however they're configured today) but by the operational units for which the doctrine has relevance to.

[George Wallace]

I have a question.  Is what is being taught, necessarily out of date, or just that the instructor can not put the points into the proper context.

The example of the "Fall in for Battle" to me has to be put into context by the instructor as something like a "Checklist" that a Section Comd must do with his troops prior to their going into battle to ensure that they have all that they require, and are prepped in all ways to complete their mission.  When this is done, can be anywhere, and any time.  It does not have to be in the immediate "dismount to engage", but could be done before rolling out of KAF on a seven day patrol, or rolling out of KAF to go to a FOB for a month, or what ever.  I think that many of our so called "archaic" procedures are not so much archaic, but just not taught in the proper context.

I can use the example of teaching ORBATs to students.  I have asked if any are familiar with ORBATs in a class, and no one will put up their hands, where they are familiar with themin their everyday lives.  Hockey Teams/Franchises have ORBATs.  Government bureaucracies have ORBATs.  City, municipal, provincial and federal governments all have ORBATs.  Everywhere we look, there are ORBATs.  There is a hierarchy to almost every aspect of our lives.  Those are ORBATs, even if not in name.   Is ORBAT an archaic term to use, just because we teach OPFOR, or is it just that many do not have the imagination to apply it to a different aspect of life? 

Do we have to "recreate the wheel" everytime people don't have the imagination to apply something to a current situation?  Is an IED nothing more that a Booby trap of old; pressure release, electrical contact, pull, remote detonated, radio controlled, timed fuse, timer, etc.?  Someone couldn't put it into context, so they "recreated the wheel".

The Instructor gets the TP and Lesson Plan.  It is up to them to teach the lesson in the proper context and using the proper and current examples.  If they don't have the knowledge and imagination to teach, and teach like autotoms, then it is the fault of the Instructor, more than the System.  The System has failed, in that it has allowed poor instructors teach.

[Infanteer]

I have a question.  Is what is being taught, necessarily out of date, or just that the instructor can not put the points into the proper context.

It's both.  The "Fall in for Battle" is clearly not putting the point into proper context - as I explained in my above post, pre-combat checks are still conducted - just not buy yelling and screaming.

However, some doctrine is out of date.  What is Anti-Armour Company?

[George Wallace]

However, some doctrine is out of date.  What is Anti-Armour Company?

Much the same as the Rifle was when we were not commited to operations requiring them Domestically or Internationally. 

[ArmyRick]

Coming from a former DP1 infantry instructor perspective, there is not a whole lot of time wasted on "Fall in for battle".

As GW noted, we have plenty of a-stan vets at our school here who still teach the basics and put the additional tips based on being in contact.

We are not as far back in the stone age as you may think.

[KevinB]

One of my biggest beefs with the system in general, is that more modern methods are not used to teach certain things.

 Buffing a floor and various other kit and quaters issues are desgined to teach attention to detail.  I can think of a million other skills that could be taught that are specifically attnetion to detail oriented adn RELEVANT to combat, because unless your inviting the taliban etc to a mess dinner, I still have not found any use for shiny floor that could not have been better taught doing somthing else.

[helpup]

Necro post or not some recent points do add to this.  Basi now incorperates FOB routine in the feild portion.  Of course no extra trg time was alloted for this and the schedual reduced in the interm for the amount of troops we are pressing throug.  Personally I think teaching FOB duty at basic is a waste of time and resources.  Sure it makes it relevant to the troops but I have to ask at what exense.  FOB's and routines are also included in Meaford and they take a mini Urban Ops package and shoe horned it into the Trg.  Again I asked so they increased the time table for Trg.  Nope but hey it is relevant to what they are doing over there. There for it is a must.  From what I have seen over the past few years the quality of troops we are getting into the Bn has fallen on both there basic wpns handling skills to feild craft.  I do not need a Pte to come to Bn knowing how to do a VCP and searches.  That is what BN trg is for.  They have dropped Trg to incorperate these currant things.  To be fair some of this was done prior to Afghan in the name of the DP system.  The reasoning being "oh let the Bn Trg them"  Well the Bn's are very busy on work up's or undermanned on reconstitution ( dont get me started on the phase system)  We now have guys trained on a particular MG in 3 days, as part of the PSWQ,  trouble was my MG Crse was over 5 freaking weeks long and included, C5, C6/ w SF 50 Cal, Turret and AD role.  We knew our Wpns after that Crse.  Now I may as well run the troops if I can once I get the NCO's back up to speed on it and dont forget the therory stuff that as NCO's we use to be taught on our small arms.  That is harder to come by. 

As we mentioned earlier in this post.  Basic SQ or BSL are a baseline, sure keep it interesting but teach them the full deal.  Let us ( Bn's ) do Msn specific and refining. 

As to the fall in to battle. funny you should mention it as we use a form of it very often and we are on work up trg.  My pl is constantly dispersed on Crse and Sect's adhoc for particular Trg. A Sgt asked me how do I organize it and a older one shouted with a laugh " Fall in for Battle." two min later his troops knew what group and team they were in, quick kit check and brief on what they were about to do and off they went.  Watching him laughing about it I asked the other one if he recalls it now......... by differant names we do a form of that more often then many may think or recall. 

Lets learn our lessons, lets train for what we are currently fighting. Let us not forgo the basics in the name of streamlining.  A soldier needs to come to Bn highly profiecient in his Wpns drills ( all wpns that a Pl would use less SF kit,in the dismounted role)  Let him come knowing his Ar$e from his head for basic feild craft, formations, moving where directed.  Let him be familiar with the basics of OBUA but for crap sake stop not teaching him to that level to make it relevant to the Stan.  Finally let him be fit enough to fight, smart enough to listen and dedicated enough to follow through. 

Give the Bn time to use our experience, ( and yes we have some vets with bad experience or focusing on this is the way we did it for our tour so that is the end all to be all ) we can, have and will use the latest lessons learned work them through it and adapt what we know for the way it is over there know anticipating what it could become...... After that may the Gods of war smile on us and drop an omnipotent foot on them.

[Technoviking]

I think that the previous poster makes some very enlightening points.  In short, keep the "basics" in basic training, for heaven's sake!  This would go well for both officer and ncm training. 
(an aside, I do recall the "fall in for battle" and the "parade-square-esque" drill that it is.  Having said that, it does work to get the troops shaken out, vice the variety of methods I have seen attempted over the years.)

[Jammer]

Ack,
The idea behind waxing floors as well as K & Q is to develop that attention to detail initially to most mundane of tasks that will/should naturally carry over to more complex evolutions as the new soldier, sailor, or airman progresses through their training.